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Abstract 
Do rightists and leftists experience information about suffering and harm with differing 
emotional intensities, depending on the identity of target depicted? Do they consequently 
choose differently how to regulate or cope with these emotions? Research has identified 
ideological differences in emotional processes, but it has yet to identify what types of content 
lead to ideological differences in emotional intensity, nor whether these content-dependent 
differences relate to differing preferences for engaging versus disengaging emotion regulation 
strategies. We posited that right-left differences in experienced emotional intensity would be 
context-dependent, emerging mostly with response to depictions of harm to the outgroup, in 
accordance with the centrality of intergroup attitudes to ideological self-placement in conflict. 
Study 1 (N = 83) supported this hypothesis, with leftists (versus rightists) experiencing 
outgroup harm (but not ingroup harm or conflict-irrelevant harm) with greater emotional 
intensity. Study 2 (N = 101) replicated this finding, additionally examining whether behavioral 
differences in regulatory choice consequently emerge mostly with regard to outgroup harm. 
We tested two competing hypotheses as to the nature of these differences: 1) the intensity 
hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would regulate their intensified reactions 
to outgroup harm through disengagement-distraction (versus engagement-reappraisal) due to a 
documented greater preference for disengaging coping strategies as intensity increases; and 2) 
the motivation hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would prefer engagement-
reappraisal (versus disengagement-distraction), consistent with leftists’ documented greater 
preference for intergroup empathy. Results exclusively supported the intensity hypothesis, and 
the significance of both studies is discussed. 
 
Keywords: emotion regulation; choice; intensity; ideology; intergroup conflict 
Word count: 8,761 excluding abstract, references and figure captions.  
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In September 2015, photos of Alan Kurdi’s washed-up body spread virally through 
the media, after the three-year-old Syrian drowned while attempting to flee Syria with his 
family to seek refuge in Europe. This viral iconic image aroused a range of emotional 
experiences and reactions among Europeans (and others) across the political spectrum 
towards the Syrian refugee outgroup. Specifically, while some individuals remained aloof, 
others were strongly swayed by the graphic nature of this image. Opinions also diverged 
regarding the potential motivational influence of such depictions. Whereas some views 
suggested that images like this one motivate people to engage, believing “[t]he reality of 
death must be seen by everyone who shares responsibility in stopping it” (Mackey, 2015), 
other views suggested an opposite motivation to disengage from the so-called “snuff photo 
for progressives” (O’Neill, 2015).  
Images like those of Alan Kurdi give rise to fundamental questions regarding the 
ability of different types of emotion-laden information to provoke emotional experiences and 
motivated reactions among individuals with different ideologies. Specifically, in the present 
study we set out to provide answers to two central interrelated questions: First, do depictions 
of suffering and harm provoke different intensities of emotion among people from opposing 
sides of the ideological spectrum, depending on the identity of target depicted? Second, 
would this differential emotional impact lead to divergent selection of motivated regulation or 
coping strategies?  
To investigate these aims, it is useful to first understand underlying psychological 
differences in the long-term attitudes, values and beliefs that are coherently encompassed in 
individuals’ political ideologies (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Ideological belief systems 
are highly important in intergroup contexts and specifically in the context of major intergroup 
conflicts, as they influence the way individuals interpret and experience conflict-related 
events (Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Dgani-Hirsch, 2009; Jost et al., 2009). Central to the 
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present focus, the psychological literature on ideology contains several indications that 
people on the right and left edges of the ideological spectrum may differ in emotion 
generation (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2009; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Tomkins, 1963) as 
well as emotion regulation (Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2014; Porat, 
Halperin, & Tamir, 2016). Specifically, it has been shown that rightists and leftists differ in 
the experience of some discrete intergroup emotions (e.g. Jost et al., 2009), in actual 
execution or implementation of specific emotion regulation strategies (Halperin, Pliskin, et 
al., 2014) and in their motivation to experience discrete emotions (Porat et al., 2016). 
While clearly important, these prior investigations did not examine whether 
ideological differences in emotion generation and regulation are moderated by different types 
of content, or whether previously identified ideological differences in emotion regulation go 
beyond the actual execution or implementation of regulatory strategies. Interactive influences 
on emotion generation are important to examine, as emotions play a key role in intergroup 
conflicts, motivating different people to react to ingroup- and outgroup-related content in 
certain, often diverging ways (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Yzerbyt, 
Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003).  
In the present study, we focus on two types of conflict-related content, comparing the 
intensities of leftists’ and rightists’ emotional reactions to harm caused to either ingroup or 
outgroup members, as well as their emotion-regulatory preferences. The existing literature 
contains many indications that the emotional impact of negative experiences or harm caused 
to outgroup members may be moderated by ideology due to documented right-left differences 
in intergroup attitudes towards outgroups in conflict (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & 
Wetherell, 2014; Duckitt, 2001; Lindner & Nosek, 2009). Specifically, rightists show higher 
delegitimization of the adversary as a justification system (Bar-Tal, 2013: Bar-Tal & 
Hammack, 2012), with initial indications emerging that this is manifested in experiencing 
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less intergroup empathy and group-based guilt in such contexts (e.g. Pliskin & Halperin, 
2016). Accordingly, leftists are likely to experience more intense emotions than rightists in 
light of depictions of harm to the outgroup, as this specific type of content relates directly to 
documented right-left differences in attitudes and discrete emotions. 
On the other hand, right-left differences in the intensity of emotional reactions to harm 
to members of their own group may not be so pronounced. Researchers have documented 
high levels of ingroup attachment (e.g. Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) and high adherence 
to societal beliefs about patriotism (Bar-Tal, 2013) in the context of intense intergroup 
conflict, and have also found that right-left differences in patriotic attachment are eliminated 
in situations involving high levels of system dependence (van der Toorn, Nail, Liviatan, & 
Jost, 2014), characteristic of intractable intergroup conflict. Therefore, we expected little or 
no substantial differences between rightists and leftists in the intensity of their emotional 
reactions to harm caused to ingroup members. In other words, we expected right-left 
differences in the intensity of emotional reactions to be content-dependent, with the direction 
and magnitude determined by the specific content at hand. Despite a clear conceptual logic, 
empirical evidence of the interactive effect of ideology and content on the intensity of 
emotion generation is lacking. 
Although direct evidence pertaining to intensity is lacking, right-left differences in the 
intensity of emotional responses to the suffering of others are likely influenced by the 
magnitude of the “intergroup empathy bias,” which refers to the tendency to display ingroup 
favoritism in by experiencing grater empathy for ingroup members (e.g., Avenanti, Sirigu, & 
Aglioti, 2010; Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014; Ellemers, 2012). Interestingly, it 
seems that the magnitude of this intergroup empathy gap is related to one’s ideology, with 
leftists extending empathy across social categories and rightists limiting their empathic 
concern to members of more proximal social categories (e.g. Waytz, Iyer, Young, & Graham, 
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2016). While some find that these right-left differences are context dependent (e.g., Brandt et 
al., 2014; Hasson, Tamir, Brahms, Cohrs, & Halperin, 2017), even these accounts would 
predict a greater gap among rightists (compared to leftists) in the context of ethnic intergroup 
conflict. For these reasons, we would expect the gap between the intensity of reactions to 
ingroup and outgroup harm to be larger among rightists than among leftists. 
Regardless of their known potent influence, emotions do not always create automatic 
changes in individual responses. In fact, affective events often lead individuals to engage in 
motivated processes that facilitate the regulation of emotional responses (Gross, 2014). Over 
the past several years, growing evidence has convincingly showed the influential role played 
by emotion regulation in the context of intergroup conflict (See Halperin, 2014). Supporting 
studies have focused on the consequences of effectively employing emotion regulation 
strategies to influence the intense group-based emotions that arise in intergroup conflict 
contexts (e.g., Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Halperin, 2014; Halperin, Porat, 
Tamir, & Gross, 2013; Halperin, Pliskin, et al., 2014).  
While being clearly important, recent conceptual models highlight that beyond an 
understanding of the consequences of employing regulatory strategies, it is also crucial to 
look at other central regulatory stages including how people select or choose between 
available regulatory strategies in different contexts (For reviews, see Aldao, 2013; Bonanno 
& Burton, 2013; Gross, 2014; Sheppes & Levin, 2013; Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015; Webb, 
Schweiger Gallo, Miles, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2012). Our recent emotion regulation choice 
model (Sheppes & Levin, 2013) focuses on the influence of a central characteristic of 
emotional events on the selection between two widely used cognitive regulatory strategies 
that represent two ends of a central engagement-disengagement dimension (Parkinson & 
Totterdell, 1999). Specifically, our model focuses on how the intensity of emotional events 
influences the selection between disengaging attention from emotional information by 
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producing neutral thoughts via distraction, and between engagement with emotional 
information while reinterpreting its negative meaning via reappraisal.  
Because emotional intensity is the strongest identified determinant of emotion 
regulation choice to date, and because we assume that ideological differences in intensity 
should mainly emerge in response to harm to the outgroup, we also expected that right-left 
differences in emotion regulation choice would emerge mostly in response to this type of 
content. In addition, congruent with right-left differences in the intergroup empathy gap, we 
expected that the ingroup-outgroup gap in emotion regulation choice would be larger among 
rightists than among leftists.. Nonetheless, the literature on emotion regulation may lead to 
two competing hypotheses regarding the expected direction of this difference. The first of 
these, the intensity hypothesis, stems directly from our ER choice model, which suggests that 
regulatory choices between engaging versus disengaging strategies are congruent with the 
costs and benefits of employing these strategies in response to stimuli of different intensities 
(Sheppes, 2014; Sheppes & Levin, 2013). Specifically, consistent with findings showing that 
for increased intensity, disengaging strategies like distraction provide stronger modulation of 
affect (e.g., Shafir, Schwartz, Blechert, & Sheppes, 2015; Shafir, Thiruchselvam, Suri, Gross, 
& Sheppes, 2016), studies (with non-political emotional stimuli) showed a strong preference 
to choose disengagement-distraction over engagement-reappraisal for high-intensity stimuli 
(e.g., Hay, Sheppes, Gross, & Gruber, 2015; Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 2011; 
Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, Radu, Blechert, & Gross, 2014). Therefore, according to this 
approach, because leftists are likely to experience harm to the outgroup with greater 
emotional intensity than rightists, they should also be more likely than rightists to prefer 
disengaging from outgroup harm via strategies like distraction. 
According to a competing motivation hypothesis, regulatory choice differences 
between rightists and leftists to harm to the outgroup may be related to differential 
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instrumental motives, and specifically social motives related to group relations (Tamir, 2016). 
Particularly relevant are recent findings in the domain of intergroup conflict (Porat et al., 
2016). While the goals of this research were not to examine choice between different modes 
of emotion regulation, its findings indicate that leftists (relative to rightists) have a higher 
emotional preference for intergroup empathy in conflict situations. Furthermore, its findings 
indicate that such ideology-congruent emotional preferences lead leftists to engage with 
content that could arouse in them their desired emotion. This is because group-based 
emotional preferences stem from the relationship an individual desires between the ingroup 
and a particular outgroup (Porat et al., 2016), and different ideologies reflect different 
intergroup goals. Specifically, leftist ideology reflects goals for change and equality (Jost et 
al., 2009), associated in conflict with a greater willingness to act to resolve intergroup 
relations (Bar-Tal, 2013). This approach would lead us to expect that leftists would have a 
greater tendency than rightists to employ engagement-reappraisal when faced with stimuli 
depicting harm to the outgroup, as engagement with these stimuli could serve their emotional 
goals. 
With these insights in mind, we set out to examine the interactive influence of 
political ideology and conflict-related content on emotion generation and emotion regulation. 
In the present investigation we concentrated on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, recognized as 
a prototypical and potent intractable conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013) and therefore an 
appropriately sensitive context in which to examine emotion generation and emotion 
regulation differences. This context has served well in the examination of right-left 
differences in emotional processes in the past (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 
2014; Halperin, Pliskin, et al., 2014; Pliskin, Bar-Tal, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2014; Porat et al., 
2016).  
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To meet our two main goals, we conducted two studies. Study 1 was designed to test 
differences in emotion generation, and Study 2 was designed to replicate and extend the 
findings of Study 1, adding a behavioral examination of differences in emotion regulation 
choice. With regard to emotion generation, we hypothesized that right-left differences would 
emerge mostly in response to depictions of harm to the outgroup, with leftists experiencing 
these depictions more intensely, in accordance of the centrality of differing outgroup attitudes 
for ideologies in intergroup conflict. We also hypothesized there would be ideological 
differences in the intensity gap between the two conflict related categories, with rightists 
displaying greater ingroup favoritism in intensity. With regard to emotion regulation, we 
hypothesized that right-left differences in regulatory choice would emerge mostly in response 
to harm to the outgroup, but we had two competing predictions as to the nature of these 
differences: 1) According to the intensity hypothesis, leftists would show a greater preference 
than rightists for a disengaging strategy (i.e. distraction) when confronted with harm to 
outgroup, because disengaging regulatory options are more effective and thus preferred for 
coping with increasing intensity (Sheppes et al., 2011, 2014); 2) According to the motivation 
hypothesis, leftists would show a greater preference than rightists for an engaging emotion 
regulation strategy (i.e. reappraisal) when confronted with harm to the outgroup, consistent 
with their social motives relating to group relations, expressed in a greater preference for 
intergroup empathy (Porat et al., 2016; Tamir, 2016). 
 
Study 1: Right-Left Differences in the Intensity of Emotional Reactions 
to Conflict Related Content 
Study 1 examined the interactive influence of political ideology and conflict-related 
content on emotion generation.  
Method 
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Participants 
A total of 83 Jewish Israelis (44 females; ages 18-40, M = 24.72, SD = 3.74), drawn 
from the student body at Tel Aviv University, participated in a one-hour laboratory study and 
received either monetary compensation (40 ILS) or course credit for their participation. 
Anticipating a range of self-reported ideological positions, we determined the sample size 
based on our wish to reach a diverse sample consisting of a minimum of 25 participants 
identifying themselves at each side as well as at the center of the ideological spectrum by the 
end of the semester. This number was based on a power analysis specifying moderate effect 
size (.25), .9 power, and a moderate minimal correlation (.3) among the repeated 
measurements, which yielded a recommended sample size of 75 (25 per “cell” when roughly 
breaking down ideology to ensure diversity). Eventually we obtained an ideologically-
balanced sample consisting of 27 participants identified as rightists or extreme rightists, 27 as 
centrist, and 29 as leftists or extreme leftists. 
Stimuli 
One hundred emotional images from various sources were divided into three 
categories: conflict-irrelevant (used as control stimuli), harm to the ingroup, and harm to the 
outgroup. The twenty conflict-irrelevant images were selected from an array of images from 
the validated International Affective Picture System (Bradley & Lang, 2007), used in prior 
studies on emotion regulation choice (Sheppes et al., 2011). Here we made sure to select only 
images with content that could not be interpreted as related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
so that these images could serve as a true control. Forty Images pertaining harm to ingroup 
(i.e., harm to Israelis) and 40 images pertaining harm to outgroup (i.e., harm to Palestinians) 
were selected from multiple resources documenting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.1 There is 
no precedence for the use of stimuli related to ingroups and outgroups in intergroup conflict 
using this paradigm, leading us to assemble two sets of stimuli ourselves. These images 
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varied in how graphic they were, in an effort to allow considerable variance in emotion-
generated intensity reports (see SEs in the results section below). While for most conflict-
related stimuli, the target group of harm could easily be identified by participants (due to the 
presence of group-specific religious or cultural symbols, the presence of writing in either 
Arabic or Hebrew, or the use of national symbols such as flags), to avoid ambiguity-related 
noise, we included short descriptions under each image identifying the location (an 
International, Israeli, or Palestinian location, depending on the type of content) and year of 
each depicted event. 
Procedure and measures 
After giving informed consent, participants were trained by the experimenter on an 
image rating task, using procedures by Bradley and Lang (2007) to practice rating Valence 
and Arousal. The practice session consisted of four trials and the task itself consisted of 100 
trials. Trials consisted of a fixation point, followed by a 5000 ms presentation of an image, 
followed by two scales: Valence (anchored at 1 = highly pleasant and 9 = very unpleasant; 
note that this scale was reverse coded from Bradley & Lang, 2007) and Arousal (anchored at 
1 = low and 9 = high). The 100 images were presented sequentially (barring two minute-long 
breaks) in a partially randomized order (using stratified randomization by type of image) and 
the order of the two scales was counterbalanced between participants. Scores were averaged 
for each scale for each of the three types of Content (Valence cronbach’s α = .79 for conflict-
irrelevant, .95 for harm to the ingroup, and .96 for harm to the outgroup; Arousal cronbach’s 
α = .94 for conflict-irrelevant images, .99 for harm to the ingroup, and .98 for harm to the 
outgroup). We also used these scores to compute within-subject differences between the 
experiences of ingroup and ourgroup harm, as a proxy for ingroup favoritism in emotion 
generation. The task was followed by a short questionnaire with several demographic 
questions, prompting participants to report their sex, age, and self-placement in terms of 
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Political Ideology (anchored at 1 = extreme right and 5 = extreme left), as well as religiosity, 
relative income, and several ideology-related items included for exploratory purposes.2 No 
additional measures were collected.  
Results and Discussion 
The interactive influence of ideology and content on emotion generation 
To examine our hypothesis that rightists and leftists would differ in their subjective 
emotional intensity mostly in response to depictions of harm to the outgroup, we ran two 
mixed effects regression models, specifying stimulus Content (conflict-irrelevant, harm to the 
ingroup, or harm to the outgroup, dummy coded and nested within participant), Ideology 
(mean centered), and their interaction as predictors, with either Valence or Arousal as the 
dependent variable in separate analyses, and adjusting for all demographic variables 
measured (i.e. Age, Sex, Religiousity, and Relative Income).3  
Using Valence ratings as an outcome (χ2 (9) = 116.33, p < .0001; see Figure 1), we 
found a significant Content × Ideology interaction, such that when harm to the outgroup was 
used as a reference category, Ideology’s influence on Valence in response to it was 
significantly different from its influence on Valence in response to both conflict-irrelevant 
stimuli (B = -.53, SE = .1, z = -5.27, p < .0001, [CI] = [-.73, -.33]) and harm to the ingroup (B 
= -.66, SE = .1, z = -6.51, p < .001, [CI] = [-.85, -.46]). Using harm to the ingroup as the 
reference category indicated no significant difference between Ideology’s simple slope for 
this category and the one for conflict-irrelevant images (B = .13, SE = .1, z = 1.25, p = .21, 
[CI] = [-.07, .32]). 
Further decomposition of the interaction revealed a significant simple effect for 
Ideology on Valence in response to harm to the outgroup: as we hypothesized, leftists 
experienced more negative valence than rightists in response to harm to the outgroup (B = 
.48, SE = .1, z = 4.63, p < .001, [CI] = [.28, .68]). Somewhat unexpectedly, the right-left 
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difference with regard to harm to the ingroup reached marginal significance, with rightists 
experiencing this content as slightly more negative than leftists (B = -.18, SE = .1, z = -1.69, p 
= .09, [CI] = [-.38, .03]). The simple effect for conflict-irrelevant images was non-significant 
(B = -.05, SE = .1, z = -.48, p = .63, [CI] = [-.25, .15]).4 
The same analysis with Arousal as an outcome (χ2 (9) = 98.01, p < .0001) revealed the 
expected significant Content × Ideology interaction, with Ideology’s influence on Arousal 
ratings in response to harm to the outgroup significantly different from its influence on both 
conflict-irrelevant images (B = -.31, SE = .11, z = -2.76, p = .006, [CI] = [-.53, -.09]) and 
harm to the ingroup (B = -.67, SE = .11, z = -5.93, p < .001, [CI] = [-.89, -.45]); see Figure 2. 
Contrary to Valence ratings, specifying harm to the ingroup as the reference category this 
time indicated a significant difference between Ideology’s influence on ratings for this 
category and for conflict-irrelevant images (B = .36, SE = .11, z = 3.18, p = .001, [CI] = [.14, 
.58]). As the latter finding could indicate trends that are not congruent with our hypothesis, 
we turned to assess the simple slopes. These provided support for our hypothesis: The trend 
in simple slopes obtained with Valence emerged for Arousal as well, but the outgroup harm 
slope this time reached only marginal significance (B = .39, SE = .23, z = 1.7, p = .09, [CI] = 
[-.06, .84]), while neither of the other two slopes reached significance (conflict-irrelevant B = 
.08, SE = .23, z = .35, p = .73, [CI] = [-.37, .53]; ingroup harm B = -.28, SE = .23, z = -1.21, p 
= .23, [CI] = [-.73, .17]).5 
Ideology’s influence on the intensity gap in responses to ingroup versus outgroup harm 
Next, we wanted to examine ideological differences in the intensity gap when 
confronted with harm to the ingroup versus the outgroup, as these indicate the magnitude of 
ingroup favoritism in emotion generation—a gap that may help us predict for whom such 
gaps would emerge in emotion regulation choice in Study 2. To this end, we examined 
ideological differences in the ingroup-outgroup gap in intensity for both Valence and 
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Arousal. Regressing the Valence difference score on Ideology (alongside the demographics 
variables listed above) revealed Ideology as a strong and significant predictor (B = -.64, SE = 
.13, t = -4.88, p < .001, [CI] = [-.9, -.38], see Figure 3a), indicating that the gap was smaller 
for leftists than for rightists, in accordance with previous findings (e.g. Waytz et al., 2016). 
The same analysis for the Arousal difference score yielded similar results, with leftist 
ideology predicting a significantly smaller Arousal gap between the two types of conflict-
related stimuli (B = -.76, SE = .14, t = -5.59, p < .001, [CI] = [-1.03, -.49]; see Figure 3b). 
The larger intensity gaps among rightists fall in line with previous work on the ingroup-
outgroup empathy gap, indicating that in the context of intractable conflict, rightists are more 
likely than leftists to demostrate ingroup favoritism in emotional intensity.  
Study 1 thus provided initial support for our first hypothesis, that right-left differences 
in emotional intensity in intergroup conflict are content-dependent, emerging most clearly in 
reactions to depictions of harm to the outgroup. Our results were clearly evident for Valence 
ratings and only tentative for Arousal rating, perhaps because political differences manifest 
less clearly in differential Arousal or because in general Arousal ratings are less intuitive for 
participants. Results also indicated a greater intensity gap among rightists (compared to 
leftists) in emotional reactions to ingroup versus outgroup harms, as demonstrated in both 
Valence and Arousal difference scores.  
Given that these results were tentative we wished to replicate them in Study 2. 
Nonetheless, because of the unexpected finding with regard to Valence in response to harm to 
the ingroup, we wanted to simplify the intensity measure by incorporating a one-dimentional 
intensity scale (e.g., Shafir et al., 2015). Importantly, Study 2 was also designed in 
accordance with our second goal of examining the interactive influence of political ideology 
and conflict-related content on emotion regulation choice.  
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Study 2: Right-Left Differences in Emotion Regulation Choice when Facing Conflict-
Related Content  
Beyond replicating the main findings obtained in Study 1, the main goal of Study 2 
was to examine our second hypothesis that ideological differences in emotion regulation 
choice patters would emerge most clearly for harm to the outgroup, congruent with 
differences in intensity. We specifically pitted this hypothesis’ two competing sub-
hypotheses one against the other: Does the greater subjective intensity of leftists’ (compared 
to rightists’) emotional response to harm to the outgroup manifest in leftists’ preference to 
disengage via distraction so as to maximize emotional modulation, as per the intensity 
hypothesis (Sheppes et al., 2011), or would it instead manifest in leftists’ greater desire to 
satisfy group-related social motives of engagement with empathy-inducing content, as per the 
motivation hypothesis (Tamir, 2016)? 
Additionally, we designed Study 2 with an eye to addressing possible shortcomings in 
Study 1 and improve on them in two ways: 1) include a simplified Intensity measure (taken 
from Shafir et al., 2015) in an effort to provide convergent support for our previously 
tentative (and partially-surprising) findings; and 2) separate the measurement of ideology 
from the measures of emotional intensity (and emotion regulation choice) so as to prevent the 
influence of demand characteristics related to ideological self-placement.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 101 Jewish Israelis (71 females; ages 17-37, M = 23.95, SD = 2.71), drawn 
from the student bodies at Tel Aviv University and the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, 
participated in a 90-minute laboratory study and received course credit or a combination of 
course credit and monetary compensation (30 ILS) for their participation. We determined the 
sample size as in Study 1 and eventually hit this target, albeit with a right-leaning sample: 44 
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participants identified as moderate to extreme rightists, 28 identified as centrists, and 29 
identified as moderate to extreme leftists. Of these, two subjects provided highly unlikely 
responses in the behavioral task (choosing only one option throughout the task), indicating a 
failure to follow instructions, and were thus excluded from the analysis.6  
Procedure and measures 
At least 24 hours before their arrival at the lab, but after scheduling their lab 
participation, participants completed a short background questionnaire online, including 
demographic information as collected in Study 1, albeit with a 7-point Ideology scale (still 
ranging from extreme right to extreme left), and measures of depression (using the Patient 
Health Questionnaire, PHQ-9, Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002) and anxiety (using the Trait Anxiety 
sub-scale of the State‐Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI, Spielberger, 1983) for exploratory 
purposes. The lab session consisted of two computerized tasks: An image rating task, 
followed by an emotion regulation choice task (adapted from Sheppes et al., 2011). The order 
of the tasks was fixed, because emotion regulation using reappraisal, which changes the 
representation of affective stimuli due to its engagement profile, may substantially affect 
Intensity ratings upon second exposure (see Blechert, Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, & Gross, 
2012; Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes, Rydstrom, & Gross, 2011). The rating task was a 
modified version of the task from Study 1, presenting each image for only 1500 ms and 
prompting participants to rate the Intensity of their negative experience on a single scale 
(anchored at 1 = not negative at all and 9 = extremely negative). Intensity scores were 
obtained by averaging scores for each type of Content (cronbach’s α = .90 for conflict-
irrelevant, .98 for harm to the ingroup, and .98 for harm to the outgroup). As in study 1, we 
also computed a difference score between the Intensity of responses to ingroup and outgroup 
harm for each participant. This was designed to assess right-left differences in the intensity 
gap for ingroup versus outgroup harm, indicating ingroup favoritism in Intensity. 
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 The regulatory choice task was based on the classic emotion regulation choice 
paradigm (Sheppes et al., 2011). It first included a four-trial training phase, in which 
participants observed negative images and were instructed either to think about something 
unrelated and emotionally neutral (distraction) or to think about the target image in a way that 
reduced its negative meaning (reappraisal). The training phase consisted of two distraction 
trials and two reappraisal trials, in counterbalanced order. Participants were then trained on 
the choice task and given three practice choice trials, in which they described their chosen 
strategy out loud and were corrected by the experimenter as needed. The practice trials were 
followed by 100 experimental trials, with each trial consisting of a 1500-2000 ms fixation 
point, followed by a 500 ms appearance of the target image, followed by a prompt to choose 
between reappraisal and distraction (onscreen position counterbalanced between 
participants), followed by a 2000 ms prompt to prepare to employ the chosen strategy, 
followed by a second 5000 ms presentation of the emotional image in which to employ the 
chosen strategy, finally followed by the Intensity scale used in the rating task.7 Participants 
were also given three minute-long breaks during the task. Consistent with prior findings, the 
proportion of distraction choice was used as the main outcome, and we also once again 
computed a difference score between the proportions of distraction choice when regulating 
harm to the ingroup versus outgroup. 
Results and Discussion  
The interactive influence of ideology and content on emotion generation 
Consistent with our first hypothesis and replicating Study 1, a mixed effects 
regression model defined as in Study 1 but with emotional Intensity as the dependent variable 
(χ2 (9) = 223.03, p < .0001; see Figure 4) yielded a significant Content × Ideology interaction. 
More specifically, Ideology’s influence on Intensity ratings for outgroup harm was 
significantly different from its influence on both conflict-irrelevant stimuli (B = -.55, SE = 
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.09, z = -6.38, p < .001, [CI] = [-.72, -.38]) and ingroup harm (B = -.88, SE = .09, z = -10.22, 
p < .001, [CI] = [-1.05, -.71]), and its influence on the Intensity of responses to ingroup harm 
also significantly differed from its influence on the Intensity of responses to conflict-
irrelevant images (B = .33, SE = .09, z = 3.84, p < .001, [CI] = [.15, .5]).  
As in Study 1, decomposition of the interaction revealed that leftists experienced harm 
to the outgroup with significantly higher Intensity than rightists (B = .58, SE = .12, z = 5.03, p 
< .001, [CI] = [.36, .81]). To our surprise they also experienced harm to the ingroup with 
significantly lower Intensity than rightists (B = -.3, SE = .12, z = -2.56, p = .01, [CI] = [-.52, -
.07]), potentially indicating we may find differences in emotion regulation choice for this 
content as well as for harm to the outgroup. As in Study 1, the simple effect for conflict-
irrelevant images was non-significant (B = .03, SE = .12, z = .29, p = .77, [CI] = [-.19, .26]).8 
The interactive influence of ideology and content on emotion regulation choice 
In order to examine the intensity and motivation hypotheses for the direction of right-
left differences in regulatory choice, we employed the same mixed-effects regression 
procedure with proportion of distraction choice as the dependent variable (χ2 (9) = 33.86, p = 
.0001; see Figure 5). As hypothesized, the analysis revealed a significant Content × Ideology 
interaction, with Ideology’s influence on the proportion of distraction choice when 
confronted with harm to the outgroup significantly different from its influence on distraction 
choice for conflict-irrelevant images (B = -.04, SE = .01, z = -3.37, p = .001, [CI] = [-.07, -
.02) as well as ingroup harm (B = -.03, SE = .01, z = -2.63, p = .01, [CI] = [-.06, -.01]). No 
such difference emerged in Ideology’s influence on choice when comparing these last two 
categories (B = -.01, SE = .01, z = -.74, p = .46, [CI] = [-.03, .02]). 
Congruent with the intensity hypothesis, but not the motivation hypothesis, when 
confronted with depictions of harm to the outgroup, leftists displayed a significantly greater 
tendency to disengage via distraction relative to rightists (B = .04, SE = .01, z = 3.23, p = 
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.001, [CI] = [.02, .06]). There were no emotion regulation choice differences between 
rightists and leftists for the other two types of Content (conflict-irrelevant B = -.003, SE = 
.01, z = -0.28, p = .78, [CI] = [-.03, .02]; harm to ingroup B = .006, SE = .01, z = .49, p = .62, 
[CI] = [-.02, .03]), despite the above findings indicating some right-left differences in 
intensity in response to this category.9 
Ideology’s influence on the ingroup versus outgroup harm choice gap, as mediated by 
intensity 
As in Study 1, we also wanted to examine right-left differences in the gap between the 
Intensity of emotion generation in response to ingroup and outgroup harm, as well as 
differences in the same gap for emotion regulation choice. Regressing the Intensity difference 
scores on Ideology, adjusting for our four demographic indicators, revealed a significant 
association (B = -.87, SE = .1, t = -8.76, p < .001, [CI] = [-1.07, -.67]; see Figure 6a), with the 
gap smaller for leftists than for rightists. In other words, we found a smaller Intensity gap for 
ingroup versus outgroup harm among leftists than among rightists, indicating that the latter 
displayed greater ingroup favoritism in Intensity than the former. The same analysis to probe 
ingroup favoritism in emotion regulation choice, employing the difference score for 
proportion of distraction choice as the dependent variable, also yielded a significant 
association with Ideology (B = -.04, SE = .01, t = -3.89, p < .001, [CI] = [-.06, -.02] ; see 
Figure 6b). More specifically, the difference in the tendency to choose distraction for ingroup 
versus outgroup harm was bigger for rightists than for leftists, congruent with the greater 
magnitude of the intensity gap identified among rightists.  
Next, we wanted to examine whether right-left differences in the intensity gap in 
emotion generation in response to ingroup versus outgroup harm may account for the similar 
differences found in emotion regulation choice, as per our hypothesis that differences in 
intensity would translate to differences in choice. An added benefit of the above approach is 
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that it allows us to use the difference scores as a proxy for the conflict-related elements in our 
above interaction analyses, in order to examine such a mediated effect. This approach is 
especially useful, as examining mediated moderation for the full effects above would be 
theoretically problematic (See Hayes, 2013, pp. 387-389). We thus ran a simple mediation 
analyses, empolying Model 4 of the PROCESS command (Hayes, 2013) with 5,000 
iterations, with Ideology as the independent variable, the Intensity difference score as a 
mediating variable, and the emotion regulation choice proportion difference score as our 
dependent variable, adjusting for the demographic indicators above.10 This analysis yielded a 
significant indirect effect (a×b = -.02, SE = .01, [CI] = [-.04, -.0002]; Sobel a×b = -.02, SE = 
.01, z = -2.04, p = .04, see figure 7), with Ideology’s total effect on the differnece in choice 
scores significant (B = -.04, SE = .01, t = -3.89, p < .001, [CI] = [-.06, -.02]), but its direct 
effect no longer significant (B = -.02, SE = .01, t = -1.52, p = .13, [CI] = [-.05, .007]). In other 
words, ideological differences in ingroup favoritism in emotion generation fully mediated 
Ideology’s influence on ingroup favoritism in emotion regulation choice patterns, with 
rightists ideology predicting a greater gap in the proportion of distraction choice through a 
greater gap in subjective Intensity between ingroup and outgroup harm.  
Taken together, the findings of Study 2 both replicate the findings of Study 1 and 
provide support for the intensity hypothesis over the motivation hypothesis: leftists are 
actually more likely than rightists to disengage from depictions of this content, as they 
experience it more intensely. This is found despite leftists’ supposed greater motivation to 
engage with the suffering of the outgroup, in accordance with the contents of leftist ideology 
in conflict. Furthermore, our data indicate that right-left differences in emotion regulation 
choice for different types of conflict-related content are mediated by differences in Intensity 
for these stimuli, indicating that ideological differences in Intensity explain ideological 
differences in choice. 




The present study provided important insights into the interactive influence of 
political ideology and conflict-related content on emotion generation and emotion regulation. 
In Study 1, we showed that right-left differences in the subjective intensity of emotional 
experience do not occur across the board, with their direction and magnitude dependent on 
the type of content at hand. Such differences are mainly limited to conflict-related content, 
with our findings indicating that in the context of intergroup conflict, leftists experience harm 
to the outgroup more negatively in both valence and arousal than rightists. Surprisingly, we 
also found that rightists experience harm to the ingroup as slightly more negative than leftists. 
We also found that the intensity gap between responses to ingroup and outgroup harm was 
larger among rightists than among leftists, indicating greater ingroup favoritism among the 
former. In Study 2, we replicated these findings and also demonstrated that in accordance 
with the greater difference found in subjective intensity in response to harm to the outgroup, 
right-left differences in emotion regulation choice are limited to the harm to the outgroup 
category of stimuli.  
Of the two competing hypotheses stemming from the literatures on emotion regulation 
choice and emotion regulation motivation, our data supported the former, intensity 
hypothesis: In accordance with prior findings that higher intensity of stimuli is the central 
determinant of disengagement choice, leftists were more likely than rightists to cope with 
their intensified negative emotions to outgroup harm through disengagement distraction. 
Furthermore, the gap in the tendency to favor disengaging modes of emotion regulation for 
ingroup versus outgroup harm was greater among rightists than among leftists, and this 
difference was mediated by the ingroup-outgroup gap in intensity scores. 
The present findings contribute to our understanding of emotion generation. Stimuli 
are often thought of in terms of the emotional intensity associated with them, but this 
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 22 
 
intensity is dependent not only on objective factors relating to its content, but also on that 
content’s relation to one’s social position or identity and on additional interpersonal 
differences, such as ideology. Each of these factors may dampen or magnify the impact a 
stimulus has on a given individual, and it is important to better understand which factors lead 
to differing intensities, how, and under what circumstances.  
As we have previously noted in reviewing the literature, knowledge on emotional 
processes cannot simply be implanted as is into the unique domain of intergroup conflict 
(Halperin & Plsikin, 2015). Non-clinical social and individual factors such as those examined 
here are rarely taken into account in stimuli caches such as the IAPS, with each stimulus 
labeled with averaged values of valence and arousal, despite the possible existence of potent 
social factors moderating the relationship between its content and the intensity it actually 
provokes. Future attempts to create a taxonomy of such factors, coupled with a better system 
of valence and arousal ratings taking such differences into account, could pave the way for a 
more nuanced understanding of emotion generation processes. 
More specifically, our findings with regard to the intensity gap and its ramifications 
for emotion generation offer a contribution to the literature on the intergroup empathy bias 
(Cikara et al., 2014), by further illuminating right-left differences in emotional responses to 
ingroup versus outgroup harm. We find that while leftists experience similar levels of 
emotional intensity in response to both kinds of harm, rightists display a greater gap in 
intensity, experiencing greater intensity in response to ingroup harm compared to outgroup 
harm. Beyond offering support for previous findings about ideological differences in the 
empathy gap (e.g. Waytz et al., 2016), we find that this gap in intensity also predicts a gap in 
the tendency to prefer one emotion regulation strategy over another (i.e. distraction over 
reappraisal). More specifically, where greater intensity is present for ingroup versus outgroup 
harm, we also find a greater tendency to employ distraction over reappraisal when regulating 
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one’s emotions. No research has thus far examined whether and in what way the intergroup 
empathy gap influences how people choose to regulate their emotions, and the present 
investigation thus offers the first indication as to the nature of this influence. Importantly, in 
accordance with the emotion regulation choice literature and its assertion that greater 
intensity leads to an increased preferences for disengaging emotion regulation strategies 
(Sheppes, 2014), a greater empathy gap means that individuals are more likely to disengage 
when confronted with harm to their own group than when confronted with harm to an 
outgroup, and future research on the empathy gap may benefit from this understanding.  
Another theoretical contribution of our findings relates to the understanding of 
emotion regulation processes in general, and regulatory selection in particular. While 
previous research using the paradigm we developed has repeatedly and successfully shown a 
clear within-subject tendency to prefer distraction as intensity increases (Sheppes, 2014; 
Sheppes et al., 2011, 2014), the present research is the first to show that interpersonal 
differences in subjective intensity manifest in between-subject differences in disengagement-
distraction choice. Furthermore, the unique regulatory selection context employed facilitated 
the examination of two competing hypotheses that stem from the literature. Specifically, the 
regulatory selection context offered clear, documented right-left differences in motivation to 
engage with stimuli that provoke ideology-congruent emotions (Porat et al., 2016), which are 
simultaneously likely related to right-left differences in the subjective experience of harm to 
the outgroup (e.g. Bar-Tal, 2013; Brandt et al., 2014; Duckitt, 2001; Lindner & Nosek, 2009).  
The present findings offer an additional important theoretical contribution to the 
political ideology literature. The present findings help illuminate the nature of right-left 
differences in intergroup affective processes, which have been debated by political 
psychologists for years (e.g. Jost et al., 2009, Brandt et al., 2014). More specifically, our 
findings provide evidence for more intense emotional reactions among leftists, but only to the 
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suffering of outgroup members, at least in the context of direct intergroup conflict. 
Understanding that right-left differences in basic psychological reactions are content-
dependent is important, because this understanding clarifies the nature of ideological 
differences and speaks to the dangers of generalizing conclusions from studies employing 
only one type of stimuli (See Kessler & Proch, 2016; Pliskin, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2015). 
Furthermore, our findings illuminate the complexity of right-left differences in emotional 
processes beyond previously documented differences in self-reported emotional experience 
(e.g. Halperin, Pliskin, et al., 2014), documenting behavioral differences in higher-level 
regulatory behaviors as well—affording them greater external validity. 
While our hypotheses were not directly related to existing knowledge in the 
psychology of morality and justice, its findings—if elaborated—may also be valuable to the 
field of moral psychology. Specifically, our findings may inform the ongoing debate on the 
nature of ideological differences in moral cognition. One approach, known as moral 
foundations theory (e.g. Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), proposes that ideological 
differences in the type of content moralized—or experienced with great moral intensity—
stem from qualitatively different moral foundations, with liberals moralizing issues such as 
loyalty or purity less than conservatives, but moralizing issues of harm to similar extents. Our 
findings, however, may provide tentative support to the competing approach, championed by 
Gray and his colleagues (Schein & Gray, 2015), according to which ideological differences in 
moralization more broadly derive from differences in the perception of harm. The present 
data indicates that harm to ingroup versus outgroup is indeed perceived differentially between 
ideological rightists and leftists, laying foundations for future work that may examine how 
such differential perceptions relate to differences in moral judgements, in addition to the 
differences we identified in emotion regulation choice. 
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The findings may also hold applied significance, as they constitute a first step towards 
a nuanced understanding of the impact emotions may have on individuals in political 
contexts. Politicians and media outlets often opt for emotion-laden appeals or reports, and 
extreme political situations are inherently emotion-laden. For these experiences to have an 
effect on attitudes or action tendencies, beyond their emotional impact, individuals must be 
willing to engage with their contents. Engagement in the form of cognitive reappraisal does 
not in itself provide sufficient condition that guarantees empathy or constructive action for 
change, because individuals may reappraise harm in ways that legitimize or excuse it. 
However, engagement is nonetheless a necessary condition for such outcomes, because 
without engagement one cannot partake in any kind of helpful behavior or foster supporting 
helpful actions. Future research may illuminate to what extent the greater tendency of leftists 
to disengage from depictions of harm to the outgroup—information that should be of special 
interest to this ideological group—could also explain low levels of action to help the 
outgroup in extreme times such as direct violent confrontations (e.g. van Zomeren & Iyer, 
2009).  
Methodologically, the present research is unique in its employment of highly-relevant 
stimuli from real-life developments in a controlled lab setting. Furthermore, the research 
design includes behavioral as well as self-report measures. Together, these two features 
increase the external validity of our findings, but future research may increase this validity 
further by taking the examination outside the lab. Examining the impact of real-life 
developments in real time further the present examination, allowing us to also investigate the 
consequent differences in outcomes such as policy support or collective action intentions—
two phenomena that may be severely altered by a tendency to disengage from emotion-
provoking developments. Such an examination may thus further illuminate the complexity of 
the ideology-content-emotional intensity relationship and its impact on emotion regulation 
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choice, while shedding light on what may be the most important outcome of these: the actual 
effects of emotional information on behavior and action intentions. 
There are several important limitations to the present investigation, which may lay the 
groundwork for future research. First, while we confirmed our hypothesis that right-left 
differences in emotional intensity would be most pronounced with regard to harm to the 
ourgroup, both studies indicated that (opposite) differences also exist in response to 
depictions of harm to the ingroup, albeit to a smaller extent. This may be an outcome of right-
left differences in a specific form of ingroup attachment—glorification (Roccas et al., 2006). 
While ingroup attachment is known to be strong across the ideological spectrum, it may be 
that rightists’ greater tendency to unconditionally glorify their own group over others leads 
them to experience harm to the ingroup somewhat more intensely than do leftists. 
Furthermore, it may be that system dependence concerns, known to eliminate right-left 
differences in patriotic attachment (van der Toorn et al., 2014), were not salient enough for 
our participants, despite the unique context of intense intergroup conflict employed, in which 
case differences in such attachment would have been present.  
Another question arising from this unexpected finding is why, despite these right-left 
difference in emotional intensity in response to harm to the ingroup, we found no right-left 
difference in regulatory choice to cope with this type of content. It may be that the competing 
forms of attachment blur possible differences in regulatory choice, or that greater differences 
in intensity are required for downstream differences in regulatory choice to emerge. Our 
finding that such differences emerge in response to ourgroup harm when controlling for 
responses to outgroup harm provide some indication for this, but further research would be 
needed in order to clarify these matters.  
A second limitation, referenced above in the discussion of our findings’ applied 
significance, relates to the different tactics people may use to regulate their emotions through 
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engagement. Reappraisal, although an engaging strategy, does not denote a specific direction 
or set of values guiding the reframing of emotion-laden content (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 
2012). Previous research on reappraisal in general (see Gross, 2014 for a full review) and in 
the context of intergroup relations (e.g. Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013) has indicated 
that this strategy can have constructive outcomes across domains. Nonetheless, while an 
individual may reappraise harm to a person or group by focusing on modes through which the 
target may be helped, she may also reappraise this harm by dehumanizing the victim, 
downplaying or justifying his suffering, or by applying any number of other non-constructive 
meanings to the emotion-provoking information (see Garnefski & Spinhove, 2011; McRae et 
al., 2012). Therefore, the mere act of regulating one’s emotion through an engaging strategy 
does not mandate a constructive outcome to this engagement, even if engagement is a 
necessary condition for such outcomes. Future research focusing on ideological differences in 
the content of reappraisal would be necessary to fully understand the different possible 
consequences of choosing among different modes of regulation. 
Additional limitations relate to the generalizability of our present findings to different 
contexts and different types of strategies. For one, we conducted both studies only in one 
context—that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although this conflict is a prototypical 
intractable conflict that offers an opportunity to examine intergroup dynamics in an ongoing, 
violent conflict rife with major real-world developments, evidence from other intergroup 
contexts, and using other types of emotion-provoking content, would provide greater external 
validity to the present findings. Additionally, we examined only two emotion regulation 
strategies in Study 2, out of many different strategies available to individuals in their daily 
lives. This examination rests on prior research employing these strategies, on the strategies’ 
high prevalence in individuals’ lives, and on their clear engagement/disengagement profile, 
but it would nonetheless be important to examine other regulatory strategies and how they 
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relate to ideological differences and different types of content. The present research makes 
initial steps in all of these directions, but further research is needed to fully illuminate the 
phenomena at its heart. 
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1  To this end, we collected images from the archives of photo-journalists Ziv Koren and Mati Milstein, who 
kindly provided us with access to many uncensored images, and from online resources on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Descriptions of these images and those taken from the IAPS can be found in the 
supplementary materials. 
2  Details on all items can be found in the supplementary materials. 
3  These variables were held constant in all analyses reported in the manuscript, but almost all results (with the 
exception of a marginally significant result in the mediation analysis in Study 2) are essentially unchanged 
when excluding them from our regression models (see supplementary materials for analyses not adjusting for 
these demographic variables). 
4  To demonstrate the robustness of our findings, we examined Ideology’s influence on Valence in response to 
each of the conflict-relevant categories while holding reactions to the other category constant. To this end, 
we ran simple regression analyses in which each of the two Valence scores was regressed on Ideology and 
the other Valence score. This approach did not adversely affect the above-reported effect (B = .56, SE = .13, 
t = 4.48, p < .001, [CI] = [.31, .81]), whereas regressing the ratings for ingroup harm on Ideology while 
adjusting for the outgroup harm ratings turned this effect significant (B = -.33, SE = .1, t = -3.18, p = .002, 
[CI] = [-.54, -.12]). The latter finding indicates that ideological differences in Valence in response to 
outgroup harm may be masking additional ideological differences in response to ingroup harm. 
5  To further examine the robustness of these findings, we again used linear regression to regress Arousal 
ratings for harm to the outgroup on Ideology while adjusting for Arousal ratings for harm to the ingroup and 
vice versa, with similar results: Ideology’s relationship to Arousal ratings for both categories was significant: 
ingroup harm B = -.64, SE = .13, t = -5.13, p < .001, [CI] = [-.89, -.39]; outgroup harm B = .59, SE = .12, t = 
5.03, p < .001, [CI] = [.36, .82]. These findings, like the findings for Valence, indicate a potential masking 
effect for responses to outgroup harm on responses to ingroup harm. 
6 Almost all results (with the exception of a marginally significant result in the mediation analysis, in which p 
= .06) remain unchanged when including these participants, and they are reported in the supplementary 
materials. 
7  Intensity scores following the implementation of chosen strategies in the emotion regulation choice task 
were not analyzed as these ratings are uninterpretable (see Scheibe, Sheppes, & Staudinger, 2015 for a 
thorough discussion).  
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8  To further probe the robustness of the above findings, we regressed Intensity ratings for harm to the 
outgroup on Ideology while adjusting for Intensity ratings for harm to the ingroup, and vice versa. We once 
again found significant relationships between Ideology and Intensity scores for both ingroup harm (B = -.74, 
SE = .11, t = -6.98, p < .001, [CI] = [-.95, -.53]) and outgroup harm (B = .77, SE = .09, t = 8.5, p < .001, [CI] 
= [.59, .95]), meaning that the above findings for each category are not explained by differences in reactions 
to the other category. 
9  Nonetheless, follow-up analyses to probe the robustness of the above findings employed linear regression to 
examine Ideology’s influence on the proportion of choice for each of the conflict-relevant categories while 
adjusting for the other category. These once again revealed that Ideology significantly predicts choice for 
both categories (ingroup harm B = -.03, SE = .01, t = -2.68, p = .009, [CI] = [-.05, -.007]; outgroup harm B = 
.04, SE = .01, t = 4.33, p < .001, [CI] = [.02, .06]). These findings indicate that the differences found for 
outgroup harm cannot be fully explained by differences for ingroup harm, but that controlling for outgroup 
harm reveals ideological differences in emotion regulation in response to ingroup harm as well, congruent 
with our findings for Intensity. 
10  It is important to note that his analysis was only marginally significant when including all problematic 
participants and when demographic variables were not included as covariates in the model (see 
supplementary materials). For these reason, and due to the theoretical constraints on examining mediated 
moderation, we suggest these findings be interpreted with caution. 
  
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 31 
 
References 
Aldao, A. (2013). The future of emotion regulation research capturing context. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 8(2), 155-172. 
Avenanti, A., Sirigu, A., & Aglioti, S. M. (2010). Racial bias reduces empathic sensorimotor 
resonance with other-race pain. Current Biology, 20(11), 1018-1022. 
Bar-Tal, D. (2013). Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bar-Tal, D & Halperin, E. (2013). The psychology of intractable conflicts: eruption, 
escalation and peacemaking. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), Oxford 
handbook of political psychology (pp. 923-956). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Bar-Tal, D., & Hammack Jr, P. L. (2012). Conflict, delegitimization, and violence. In L. R. 
Tropp (Ed.), Oxford handbook of intergroup conflict (pp. 29–52). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bar-Tal, D., Raviv, A., Raviv, A., & Dgani-Hirsch, A. (2009). The influence of the ethos of 
conflict on the Israeli Jews’ interpretation of Jewish-Palestinian encounters. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 53, 94–118. 
Blechert, J., Sheppes, G., Di Tella, C., Williams, H., & Gross, J. J. (2012). See what you 
think reappraisal modulates behavioral and neural responses to social 
stimuli. Psychological Science, 23(4), 346-353. doi: 10.1177/0956797612438559. 
Bonanno, G. A., & Burton, C. L. (2013). Regulatory flexibility an individual differences 
perspective on coping and emotion regulation. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 8(6), 591-612. 
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2007). The International Affective Picture System (IAPS) in 
the study of emotion and attention. In J. A. Coan & J. J. B. Allen (Eds.), Handbook of 
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 32 
 
emotion elicitation and assessment (pp. 29–46). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The 
ideological-conflict hypothesis intolerance among both liberals and 
conservatives. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(1), 27-34. 
Cikara, M., Bruneau, E., Van Bavel, J. J., & Saxe, R. (2014). Their pain gives us pleasure: 
How intergroup dynamics shape empathic failures and counter-empathic responses. 
Journal of experimental social psychology, 55, 110-125. 
Cohen-Chen, S., Halperin, E., Crisp, R. J. & Gross, J. J. (2014). Hope in the Middle East: 
Malleability beliefs, hope, and the willingness to compromise for peace. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 5(1), 67-75. 
Cohen-Chen, S., Halperin, E., Porat, R., & Bar-Tal, D. (2014). The differential effects of 
hope and fear on information processing in intractable conflict. Journal of Social and 
Political Psychology, 2(1), 11-30. 
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and 
prejudice. Advances in experimental social psychology, 33, 41-113. 
Ellemers, N. (2012). The group self. Science, 336(6083), 848-852. 
Garnefski, N., Kraaij, V., & Spinhoven, P. (2001). Negative life events, cognitive emotion 
regulation and emotional problems. Personality and Individual differences, 30(8), 
1311-1327. 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets 
of moral foundations. Journal of personality and social psychology, 96(5), 1029.  
Gross, J. J. (Ed.). (2014). Handbook of emotion regulation: Second edition. New York, NY: 
Guilford Press. 
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 33 
 
Halperin, E. (2011). Emotional barriers to peace: Emotions and public opinion of Jewish 
Israelis about the peace process in the Middle East. Peace and Conflict: Journal of 
Peace Psychology, 17, 22-45.  
Halperin, E. (2014). Emotion, emotion regulation, and conflict resolution. Emotion 
Review, 6(1), 68-76.  
Halperin, E., & Pliskin, R. (2015). Emotions and emotion regulation in intractable conflict: 
Studying emotional processes within a unique context. Political Psychology, 36(S1), 
119-150. 
Halperin, E., Pliskin, R., Saguy, T., Liberman, V., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Emotion regulation 
and the cultivation of political tolerance: Searching for a new track for intervention. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(6), 1110-1138. 
Halperin, E., Porat, R., Tamir, M & Gross, E. (2013). Can emotion regulation change 
political attitudes in intractable conflict? From the laboratory to the 
field. Psychological Science, 24, 106-111. 
Hasson, Y., Tamir, M., Brahms, K., Cohrs, J. C., & Halperin, E. (2017). Are liberals and 
conservatives equally motivated to feel empathy toward others? Manuscript submitted 
for publication. 
Hay, A. C., Sheppes, G., Gross, J. J., & Gruber, J. (2015). Choosing how to feel: Emotion 
regulation choice in bipolar disorder. Emotion, 15(2), 139. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process 
analysis: A regression-based approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: 
Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. Motivation and Emotion, 36(1), 55-64. 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, 
and elective affinities. Annual review of psychology, 60, 307-337. 
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 34 
 
Kessler, T., & Proch, J. (2016, June). Brunswik meets politics: Toward an ecological 
approach to political psychology. Paper presented at the 18th Jena Workshop on 
Intergroup Processes - The psychology of political ideology: Insights from intergroup 
approaches, Oppurg, Germany. 
Kroenke, K., & Spitzer, R. L. (2002). The PHQ-9: a new depression diagnostic and severity 
measure. Psychiatric annals, 32(9), 509-515. 
Lindner, N. M., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Alienable Speech: Ideological Variations in the 
Application of Free‐Speech Principles. Political Psychology,30(1), 67-92. 
Mackey, R. (2015, September 2). Brutal images of Syrian boy drowned off turkey must be 
seen, activists say. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/middleeast/brutal-images-of-syrian-boy-
drowned-off-turkey-must-be-seen-activists-say.html?_r=0 
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: explaining offensive 
action tendencies in an intergroup context. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 79(4), 602-616. 
McRae, K., Ciesielski, B., & Gross, J. J. (2012). Unpacking cognitive reappraisal: goals, 
tactics, and outcomes. Emotion, 12(2), 250. 
O’Neill, B. (2015, September 3). Sharing a photo of a dead Syrian child isn’t compassionate, 
it’s narcissistic. The Spectator. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2015/09/sharing-a-photo-of-the-dead-syrian-child-isnt-
compassionate-its-narcissistic/ 
Parkinson, B., & Totterdell, P. (1999). Classifying affect-regulation strategies.Cognition & 
Emotion, 13(3), 277-303. 
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 35 
 
Pliskin, R., Bar-Tal, D., Sheppes, G., & Haperin, E. (2014). Are leftists more emotion-driven 
than rightists? The interactive influence of ideology and emotions on support for 
policies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(12), 1681-1697. 
Pliskin, R., & Halperin, E. (2016). Emotions and emotion regulation in intractable conflict 
and their relation to the ethos of conflict in Israeli society. In K. Sharvit & E. Halperin 
(Eds.), The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: A social psychology perspective – Celebrating 
the legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal (Vol. II) (pp. 167-184). New York: Springer. 
Pliskin, R., Sheppes, G., & Halperin, E. (2015). Running for your life, in context: Are 
rightists always less likely to consider fleeing their country when fearing future 
events? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 59, 90-95. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.04.001 
Porat, R., Halperin, E., Tamir, M. (2016). What we want is what we get: Group-based 
emotional preferences and conflict resolution. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 110 (2), 167-190.  
Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2006). The paradox of group-based guilt: modes of 
national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-group's moral 
violations. Journal of personality and social psychology, 91(4), 698-711. 
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2015). The Unifying Moral Dyad Liberals and Conservatives Share 
the Same Harm-Based Moral Template. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
41(8), 1147 - 1163. 
Shafir, R., Schwartz, N., Blechert, J., & Sheppes, G. (2015). Emotional intensity influences 
pre-implementation and implementation of distraction and reappraisal. Social 
cognitive and affective neuroscience, 10(10), 1329-1337. 
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 36 
 
Shafir, R., Thiruchselvam, R., Suri, G., Gross, J. J., & Sheppes, G. (2016). Neural processing 
of emotional-intensity predicts emotion regulation choice. Social cognitive and 
affective neuroscience, 11(12):1863-1871. 
Sheppes, G. (2014). Emotion regulation choice: theory and findings. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), 
Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 126-139). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Sheppes, G., & Levin, Z. (2013). Emotion regulation choice: selecting between cognitive 
regulation strategies to control emotion. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 7, 179. 
Sheppes, G., & Meiran, N. (2007). Better late than never? On the dynamics of online 
regulation of sadness using distraction and cognitive reappraisal. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(11), 1518-1532. 
Sheppes, G., Scheibe, S., Suri, G., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Emotion-regulation 
choice. Psychological Science, 22(11), 1391-1396 
Sheppes, G., Scheibe, S., Suri, G., Radu, P., Blechert, J., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Emotion 
regulation choice: a conceptual framework and supporting evidence. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 143(1), 163-181. 
Spielberger, C. D. (1983). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). Palo Alto, 
CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Tamir, M. (2016). Why do people regulate their emotions? A taxonomy of motives in 
emotion regulation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 20(3), 199-222 
Thiruchselvam, R., Blechert, J., Sheppes, G., Rydstrom, A., & Gross, J. J. (2011). The 
temporal dynamics of emotion regulation: an EEG study of distraction and 
reappraisal. Biological psychology, 87(1), 84-92. 
Tomkins, S. S. (1963). Left and right: A basic dimension of ideology and personality. In R. 
W. White (Ed.), The study of lives (pp. 388-411). Chicago, IL: Atherton. 
WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 37 
 
van der Toorn, J., Nail, P. R., Liviatan, I., & Jost, J. T. (2014). My country, right or wrong: 
Does activating system justification motivation eliminate the liberal-conservative gap 
in patriotism?. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 50-60. 
van Zomeren, M., & Iyer, A. (2009). Toward an integrative understanding of the social and 
psychological dynamics of collective action. Journal of Social Issues, 65, 645–660. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2009.01618.x 
Waytz, A., Iyer, R., Young, L., & Graham, J. (2016). Ideological differences in the expanse 
of empathy. In P. Valdesolo & J. Graham (Eds.), Social Psychology of Political 
Polarization. (pp. 61-77). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Webb, T. L., Schweiger Gallo, I., Miles, E., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2012). 
Effective regulation of affect: An action control perspective on emotion 
regulation. European Review of Social Psychology, 23(1), 143-186. 
Yzerbyt, V., Dumont, M., Wigboldus, D., & Gordijn, E. (2003). I feel for us: The impact of 
categorization and identification on emotions and action tendencies. British Journal of 







WHEN IDEOLOGY MEETS CONFLICT-RELATED CONTENT 38 
 
 
Figure 1: The interactive influence of ideology and type of content on valence ratings in 
Study 1. The significant slope for harm to the outgroup indicates that leftists (compared 
to rightists) experienced this content as more negative, whereas the marginally 
significant slope for harm to the ingroup means that rightists (compared to leftists) 
experienced this content as somewhat more negative. 
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Figure 2: The interactive influence of ideology and type of content on levels of self-
reported arousal in Study 1. The marginally significant slope for harm to the outgroup 
indicates that leftists experienced this content as more negative than did rightists. 
  





Figure 3: Ideology’s relation to ingroup favoritism (responses to ingroup harm minus 
responses to outgroup harm) in valence (a) and arousal (b), with rightists (compared to 
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Figure 4: The interactive influence of ideology and type of content on the subjective 
intensity of participants’ negative experience in Study 2. The significant slope for harm 
to the outgroup indicates that leftists (compared to rightists) experienced this content 
more intensely, whereas the significant slope for harm to the ingroup means that 
rightists (compared to leftists) experienced this content more intensely than did leftists. 
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Figure 5: The interactive influence of ideology and type of content on the proportion of 
participants’ choice of distraction over reappraisal in Study 2. The significant slope for 
harm to the outgroup indicates that leftists (compared to rightists) displayed a greater 
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Figure 6: Ideology’s relation to ingroup favoritism (responses to ingroup harm minus 
responses to outgroup harm) in intensity (a) and proportion of distraction choice (b), with 
rightists (compared to leftists) exhibiting a larger intensity gap as well as a larger gap in 
preference for disengagement-distraction over engagement-reappraisal. These findings 
indicate greater ingroup favoritism among rightists in both emotional intensity and emotion 
regulation choice.  
(a) (b) 











Figure 7: Mediation model for ideology’s influence on difference scores in proportion of 
distraction choice when regulating ingroup harm versus outgroup harm, as mediated by 
difference scores in emotional intensity in response to ingroup harm versus outgroup harm in 
Study 2. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
All coefficients are unstandardized. 
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